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INDIAN LAW 
I. COL VILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES v. WALTON: 
CONVEYANCE OF RESERVATION LAND; WINTERS 
RIGHTS TRANSFERRED TO NON-INDIAN 
PURCHASERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton; the Ninth Cir-
cuit faced the complex and often conflicting interests involved in 
litigation concerning federal, state, and tribal authority over fed-
eral Indian reservation lands. The court attempted to balance 
the competing interests for the water, a limited and vital natural 
resource, on the Colville Indian Reservation. In so doing, the 
Ninth Circuit followed traditional principles of reserved water 
rights. Howeyer, the court moved away from the current assimi-
lationist trend which has increased state court jurisdiction- over 
Indian activities. 
B. FACTS 
In 1872, President Grant created the Colville Reservation to 
protect the Indian's interest in the land.' In 1906, Congress rati-
fied an agreement with the Colville Indians4 which distributed 
1. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wright, J.j the other panel members were Skopil, 
J. and Curtis; S.D.J .• sitting by designation). cert. denied. 50 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Dec. I, 
1981). 
2. The assimilationist trend now evident from the recent Supreme Court decisions iI 
discUBBed and analyzed in Dellwo. Recent Developments in the Northwest Regardi"ll 
Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RBsOURCBS J. 101·21 (19SO). 
3. Executive Order of July 2, 1872, reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER. INDIAN AFFAIRS·LAWS 
AND TREATIES. 915·16 (i904). 
The relevant language from the order is as follows: 
Id. at 916. 
It is hereby ordered that. . . the country bounded on the 
east and south by the Okanogan River. and on the north by 
the British poBBessions be, and the same is hereby, set apart as 
a reservation for said Indians, and for such other Indians as 
the Department of the Interior may see fit to locate thereon. 
4. Act of Mar. 22. 1906. Pub. L. No. 59·61. ch. 1126. 34 Stat. SO. The agreement was 
effectuated by presidential proclamation. Proclamation of May 3. 1916. 39 Stat. 1718. 
229 
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reservation lands to individual Indians according to the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 (the Act)." In 1917, the No Name Creek, a 
non-navigable waterway located entirely within the reservation, 
was divided into seven allotments. The defendant, a non-Indian, 
purchased three of the lots from a non-tribe-member Indian.' At 
the time of purchase, defendant's predecessor had been irrigat-
ing thirty-two acres. After purchasing the lots, the defendant ob-
tained state permits and began irrigating 104 acres. Plaintiffs 
hold rights to the remaining four lots." 
The plaintiffs subsisted on salmon and trout until construc-
tion of dams on the Columbia River destroyed the salmon runs. 
In 1968, the plaintiffs, along with the Department of Interior, 
stocked the Omak Lake with trout. Because the non-indigenous 
trout required fresh water to spawn, the plaintiffs cultivated the 
lower No Name Creek as spawning grounds. The defendant, 
however, depleted the water flow during spawning season when 
he irrigated his land.' The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the deple-
tion. The district court held the plaintiffs' right to the water was 
superior and, based on a showing of "present need," awarded the 
plaintiffs sufficient water. to irrigate their land but awarded the 
balance to the defendant~' The lower court decided that the 
tribe had no "current need" for water to maintain its fishing 
grounds and, therefore, a "reservation of water for such use will 
not be implied at this time."lo In addition, the district court 
held that the state has jurisdiction to grant permits for the ex-
cess waters found available,u 
5. 25 u.s.c. §§ 331-358 (1976). The Act divided the reservation's land on a per. cap· 
ita basis among the individual tribe members. The purpose of the Act was to encourage 
the 888imilation of the individual tribe members into society. Allotted lands were held in 
trust for 25 years to protect the Indians from "sharp practices leading to Indian landless· 
neBS." See F. COHBN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 221 (1940). 
6. 647 F.2d at 45. 
7. The federal government holds the remaining four lots in trust for the Colville 
Tribe.ld. 
8.ld. 
9. 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Wash. 1978). 
10.ld. 
11.ld. 
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C. BACKGROUND 
Tribal Water Rights 
INDIAN LAW 231 
In the landmark case Winters v. United States, II the Su-
preme Court held that when a reservation is created out of the 
public domain there is an implied reservation of water sufficient 
to sustain the tribal existence.18 The water . right vests on the 
date the reservation is created and is not lost by non-use.14 The 
reserved water right is subject only to appropriations of water 
made prior to the creation of the reservation. The Winters 
Court, in essence, held that a reservation of water necessary for 
the land was reserved to support the agricultural use and a "civ-
ilized lifestyle. " IIi The Court examined the purpose underlying 
the creation of the reservation and held that sufficient water was 
reserved to assure that that purpose could be met. Ie Winters, 
however, left unanswered how the amount of water reserved 
should be determined or what "purposes" are included in the 
reserved rights. 
In Arizona v. California,17 the Court clarified some of the 
questions left unanswered by Winters. The Arizona Court ex-
tended a right to the amount of water needed to irrigate all of 
the "irrigable acreage" on the reservation. Ie The Court limited 
its holding, however, to the agricultural use of the water by the 
reservation. 19 
Reservations can be created for purposes other than provid-
ing for a land-based agrarian society.lo The extent of water im-
pliedly reserved for such purposes, however, has been limited. In 
Cappaert v. United States,81 the Court limited the reserved 
water right to the minimum quantity necessary to satisfy the 
12. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
13. Id. at 577. 
14.Id. 
15. Id. at 576. 
16.Id. 
17. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
18. Id. at 600-01. 
19. Id. at 596. 
20. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d ato48. See Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indi-
ans, 304 U.S. III (1938); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918). 
21. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
3
Titus: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
232 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.12:229 
purposes for which the reservation was created.11 In United 
States v. New Mexico,l. the Supreme Court reaffirmed this prin-
ciple when it limited the reserved water rights of a federal reser-
vation to the primary purposes for which the reservation was 
created and deferred to state law when the purpose was deemed 
secondary." 
At present, courts may reserve the right to the minimum 
quantity of water needed to fulfill the primary purpose of the 
reservation. This standard is complicated by the often unarticu-
lated and ambiguous statements of the specific purpose for 
which a reservation may be created. Therefore, the determina-
tion of the reserved water rights requires interpreting the "docu-
ment and circumstances surrounding the [reservation's] crea-
tion, and the history of the Indians for whom it was created."1II 
Although the reserved water rights of the reservation are 
firmly established, there is serious doubt as to when the use of 
the reserved water may be altered without forfeiting the reserva-
tion's superior right. 
The Rights of a Non-Indian Purchaser of Alloted Land Vis-a-
vis Indian Allottees . 
The allotment of reservation land to individual tribe mem-
bers has created the issue of whether the individuals may trans-
fer the reserved water rights in the land to non-Indians. The al-
lotment of tribal land, accomplished pursuant to the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 (the Act),·' allowed for the conveyance of 
reservation land to individual Indians. After the federal govern-
ment held the land in trust for twenty-five years, it was con-
22. ld. at 14l. 
23. 438 U.S. 696' (1978). 
24. ld. at 702. 
25. 647 F.2d at 47. 
26. The Act mentions water rights in § 7: 
In cases where the use of water for irrigation is nece888ry 
to render the lands within any Indian reservation available for 
agricultural purposes, the Secretary of the Interior is author-
ized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem 
necessary to secure a just and equal distribution thereof 
among the Indians . . . . 
25 U.S.C. § 381 (1976). 
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veyed in fee to the individual Indians.1'7 
The Act expedited the assimilation of reservation Indians 
into non-Indian culture and society/~8 and the trust period was 
designed to protect the Indiansl9 in the interim. The Act, how-
ever, did not address the transferability of water rights, by the 
Indians holding such land in fee, to non-Indian purchasers.8o 
In United States v. Powers,81 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the principle that when reservation land was transferred 
to individual members of the tribe, the individual allottee suc-
ceeded to the tribe's Winters rights in that land.82 The Powers 
Court, however, failed to clearly define the nature and extent of 
those rights. The Court stated in dictum that "when allotments 
of land were duly made for exclusive use and thereafter con-
veyed in fee, the right to use some portion of tribal waters essen-
tial for cultivation passed to the owners."88 Whether the transfer 
of the allotment by the Indian allottee to a non-Indian includes 
the reserved water rights is unclear. The strongest statement on 
non-Indian rights to reserved water is found in United States v. 
Ahtanum.84 In Ahtanum, the Ninth Circuit held that when al-
lotted lands are conveyed to a non-Indian, the transferee is en-
titled to "participate rateably" with Indian allottees.aa 
Because the Allotment Act does not express whether non-
Indians succeed to the Indian allottee's water rights, the courts 
must construe the congressional intent behind the Act. The gen-
eral rule of interpretation requires that" '[d]oubtful expressions 
are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people 
who are wards of the nation, dependent on its protection and 
27. [d. § 348. 
28. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MOHONK LAKE 
CONFERENCE, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 75, 49th Cong., 2d SeBII. 992 (1887). 
29. F. COHEN, supra note 5, at 221. 
30. 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1976). For the relevant text of § 381, see note 26 supra. 
31. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). 
32. [d. at 532. 
33. [d. 
34. 236 F.2d 321, 342 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957), modified, 
330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964). See also United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 
1979); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928). The right to transfer water 
rights when alloted lands are leased was upheld by ihe Ninth Circuit in Skeem v. United 
States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921). 
35. 236 F.2d at 342. 
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good faith.' "86 Many questions still confront the courts under 
the issue of non-Indian rights to reserved water. The Supreme 
Court has yet to determine congressional intent under the Allot-
ment Act insofar as it affects the transferability of reserved wa-
ters. In addition the nature and extent of the allottee's water 
rights and those of any successors are not clearly defined. 
State Power to Regulate Water Use Within the Reservation 
With the increased importance of water in the western 
states, the reserved water rights of Indian reservations have be-
come crucial. Courts are confronted not only by increasing con-
flict over ownership of water rights between Indians and non-
Indians, but also over who shall have the authority to determine 
those rights. 
The Supreme Court has steadily increased the number· of 
areas in which states may take jurisdiction over matters previ-
ously considered under either federal or tribal authority. a, This 
trend by the Court has been termed an assimilationist policy." 
State jurisdiction, however, is barred when pre-empted by fed-
erallaw or when it unlawfully infringes on the right of the reser-
vation Indians to self-government. ae 
In Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,'o the Court barred 
state regulation of water use on federal reservations absent an 
explicit recognition of the state's authority.u Congress recog-
nized the state's authority to regulate water on the public do-
main in a series of Acts culminating in the Desert Land Act of 
1887." The Court, in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co.," considered this legislation before hold-
ing that Congress had given the states plenary authority over 
water on the public domain." California Oregon Power Co. was 
36. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tn Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quoting 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930». 
37. See Dellwo, supra note 2, at 101. 
38. rd. 
39. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980). 
40. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). 
41. rd. at 448. 
42. Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321·323 
(1976». 
43. 295 U.S. 142 (1935). 
44. ld. at 163-64. 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court in New Mexico. The New Mex-
ico Court expressed the view that "Congress almost invariably 
defers to state water law."411 In California v. United States,48 the 
Court stated that the rationale behind deference to state law 
stems from the desire to avoid the "legal confusion that would 
arise if federal water law reigned side by side in the same local-
ity."47 However, the Desert Land Act did not intend to remove 
Congress' authority over unappropriated water on land with-
drawn from the public domain.48 
Jurisdiction to adjudicate reserved water rights on Indian 
land has also been granted by the McCarran Amendment.49 In 
United States v. District Court for Water Division No. 5,110 the 
Court held that the McCarran Amendment gave state courts ju-
risdiction to hear federal water rights cases.1I1 The Court ex-
tended its holding to include the adjudication of Winters rights 
in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States.1I1 
A state's authority to regulate water within a federal reser-
vation will depend on an expression of federal intent to give the 
states such power. The trend of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions signals an increasing expansion of the state's power to reg-
ulate water rights. as 
Tribal sovereignty has to a considerable degree prevented 
intrusions of state law into Indian land. However, in Montana v. 
45. 438 U.S. at 696. 
46. 438 U.S. 645 (1978) . 
. 47. Id. at 668·69. 
48. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597·98 (1963). 
49. Section 208(a) of the McCarran Act provides: 
Consent is given to join the United States as defendant in 
any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of 
a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of 
such rights, where it appears that the United States is owner 
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropria· 
tion under state law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise, and 
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. 
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976). 
50. 401 U.S. 527 (1971). 
51. Id. at 529. 
52. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
53. See Dellwo, supra note 2. 
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United States,~ the Court recently stated that a "tribe's inher-
ent power to regulate generally the conduct of non-members on 
land no longer owned by, or held in trust for, the tribe was im-
pliedly withdrawn as a necessary result of its dependent sta-
tus."GG The Montana Court excepted from the implied with-
drawal of tribal authority the conduct of non-members that 
"threatens or has some direct effect on the health and welfare of 
the tribe. "G6 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
Tribal Water Rights 
The plaintiffs argued that the tribe had superior reserved 
water rights to No Name Creek waters and that there was insuf-
ficient water to satisfy both parties' needs. The defendants 
claimed water rights on two theories. First, they claimed rights 
as successors to Indian allottees. Second, they claimed appropri-
ative rights perfected under state law. 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by comparing Colville 
with Winters and Arizona. G'7 The court stated that Congress had 
the power to reserve unappropriated waters for "specific federal 
purposes"G8 and that where it is necessary an implied reservation 
will be found to "fulfill those purposes."G. Furthermore, it was 
Congress' intention "to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving 
waters without which their lands would be useless.''-O In holding 
that water had been reserved for the reservation, the court 
stressed that the members of the reservation had relinquished 
extensive land and water holdings.e1 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that because the "Indians were not in a position, either 
economically or in terms of their development of farming skills, 
to compete with non-Indians for water rights,'''· Congress in-
tended to reserve water for them. 
54. 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). 
55. [d. at 1257. 
56. [d. n.15. 
57. 647 F.2d at 46. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. (quoting United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908». 
60. 647 F.2d at 47. 
61. [d. at 46-47. 
62. [d. at 46. 
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Next, the court decided the extent of those reserved rights. 
The Ninth Circuit expanded the New Mexico test to consider 
the effect of changed circumstances on the reservation's reserved 
water rights. The court reasoned that the original purpose for 
which the water was reserved-to provide a homeland-allowed 
the reservation to use the reserved water for more than just irri-
gation. Because the Colville Indians traditionally relied on both 
salmon and trout for survival, the court held that the reservation 
could use the reserved waters to develop and replace fishing 
grounds destroyed by the dams.8a 
The implied reservation of water rights for the fishing 
grounds was based on their "economic and religious'''' impor-
tance. The Colville court elevated the fishing rights of the reser-
vation to the level of a primary purpose within the New Mexico 
test and found that the reservation was created to preserve such 
rights.S& The Ninth Circuit thereby expanded the reserved water 
rights under the Winters doctrine to include preservation of the 
Indians' fishing grounds. The court, however, went on to define 
the scope of the reserved water rights to include their use "in 
any lawful manner."ss Further, "subsequent acts making the his-
torically intended use of the water unnecessary do not divest the 
Tribe of the right to the water."87 In addition, the court stated 
that it would be consistent with the general purpose of "provid-
ing a homeland" to allow the Indians themselves to determine 
how reserved waters should be used." 
The Rights of a Non-Indian Purchaser of Allotted Lands Vis-a-
vis Indian Allottees 
The Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court, held that a 
non-Indian had rights to reserved water." The Colville court 
limited the non-Indians' rights, however, to water being appro-
priated at the time the non-Indian acquired title and to water 
63. [d. at 48. 
64. [d. 
65. Id. at 47·48. 
66. [d. at 48. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 49. 
69. The district court held that the Winters reserved rights did not apply per Be to 
allotments owned by non-Indians. 460 F. Supp. at 1326. 
9
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appropriated thereafter with "reasonable diligence."'o The water 
80 appropriated would be given a "date-of-reservation" prior-
ity.'71 The non-Indian would lose his water rights, however, if he 
could not demonstrate a continuous use. '71 
The court examined the intent of the General Allotment 
Act and the nature of the allottee's rights. The Colville court 
affirmed the Indian allottee's right to use reserved waters and 
stated that as a general rule the "termination or diminution of 
[those] rights requires express legislation or a clear inference of 
Congressional intent."'71 Notwithstanding the district court's de-
cision, the Ninth Circuit found that, absent the legislation or 
clear inference, the allottee's rights to reserved waters were pro-
tected. The court reiterated that Congress designed the trust pe-
riod to protect the allottee and once that period expired the al-
lottee could freely transfer his or her land.'· By then denying 
the allottee the ability to transfer the allotment with reserved 
water rights after the trust period expired, the allotment would 
be rendered less valuable, constituting a de facto limitation on 
transferability. Therefore the limitation was a diminution of the 
allottee's rights unsupported by any "Congressional intent" or 
"express legislation. "'711 
The Ninth Circuit answered the questions left open by the 
Powers Court" as to the extent of the right acquired by nOD-
Indian purchasers. The court cited Ahtanum,"'·1 to determine 
that three factors control the extent and nature of these rights. 
First, the number of "irrigable acres" the allottee owns deter-
mines the maximum amount of water the non-Indian has a right 
to. '7'7 Second, the priority date of that right determines the value 
of the allottee's right.'8 Third, the Indian retains his reserved 
70. 647 F.2d at 51. 
71. Id. 
72.1d. 
73. Id.at SO. 
74. The purpose of the trust was to protect Indians from being robbed of their land. 
See F. COHEN, supra note 55, at 22l. 
75. 647 F.2d at SO. 
76. See generally text accompanying notes 31·35 supra. 
76.1. United States v. Ahtanum, 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 
988 (1957), modified, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964). See also United States v. Adair, 478 
F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928). 
77. 647 F.2d at 51. 
78. [d. 
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water right despite non-use; the non-Indian does not.'· 
State Power to Regulate Water Use Within the Reservation 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that 
the state of Washington controlled the force or effect of water 
permits within the reservation. In support, the court determined 
that the creation of the reservation pre-empted the state's au-
thority over the land.so 
1. Federal Pre-emption 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the creation of the reserva-
tion pre-empted the state's regulatory power over No Name 
Creek.81 The court cited Federal Power Commission to support 
the principle that the state can only regain its regulatory power 
over federal reservations by "explicit federal recognition."81 
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the court examined 
the rationale behind the usual policy of deferring to the states 
when water rights were involved. The Colville court stated that 
the usual policy of deferring to the state law does not apply here 
because No Name Creek is non-navigable and entirely within 
the reservation. Therefore, "state regulation of some portion of 
its waters would create the jurisdictional confusion the Congress 
has sought to avoid. "88 Also, the court found no impact on the 
state if either the tribe or the federal government regulated the 
water.14 
2. Tribal Sovereignty 
The court agreed that the Montana decision withdrew much 
of the tribe's inherent power to regulate non-members on land 
no longer held by the reservation.8s However, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized the critical importance of the water system to the 
reservation. Citing the exceptions to the rule in Montana, the 
79. [d. 
SO. [d. at 52-53. 
81. [d. at 52. Enroute to its decision, the court discussed the federal pre-emption 
doctrine and the inherent authority of the tribe, but did not decide which doctrine was 
controlling. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. at 53. 
84_ [d. (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955». 
85. 647 F.2d at 52. 
11
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court stated that the "water system is a unitary resource. The 
actions of one user have a direct and immediate effect on other 
users. "88 Therefore, regulating the water is critical to the Indians 
and an important sovereign power that the Montana Court did 
not impliedly withdraw.8? 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
In Colville, the Ninth Circuit panel faced the growing and 
crucial question of what rights in reserved water may be trans-
ferred when a non-Indian purchases reservation lands. In addi-
. tion, the court decided which entity would have the ultimate au-
thority to adjudicate those rights. The decision reflects an 
equitable compromise which gives non-Indian transferees some 
degree of certainty over the amount of water they may use and 
appropriate without fear of its loss to a superior reserved right 
held by the reservation. Perhaps most significant in Colville is 
the court's holding that the non-Indian has a "rateable" share of 
the reservation's reserved water rights. 
The growing intrusion of state authority to adjudicate non-
Indian rights on reservation lands has to some extent been lim-
ited in regard to water rights. U The Ninth Circuit expressed its 
preference for relegating state authority to both federal pre-
emption and tribal sovereignty. The reliance on federal pre-
emption principles, however, may signal another blow to the 
scope of Indian tribal self-government." In considering this, the 
court stated that Indians should have the power to determine to 
what uses reserved water may be put so long as that use is con-
sistent with "general purpose for the creation of an Indian 
reservation. ''10 
The growing importance of water rights in the western 
states will inevitably force further confrontations between the 
conflicting interests.·1 The Ninth Circuit took a giant step to-
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
88. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the application of the McCarran Act without dis-
cussion. Id. at 53. 
89. See 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 315, 350·57 (1980). 
90. 657 F.2d at 49. 
91. See Laird, Water Rights: The Winters Cloud Ouer the Rockies: Indian Water 
Rights and Development 01 Western Energy Resources, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 155 (1979). 
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wards resolving any subsequent conflicts by defining the nature· 
and extent of water rights non-Indian purchasers acquire in re-
servation lands. In addition, deciding that the federal govern-
ment should adjudicate conflicts involving those rights will in-
crease the likelihood that a more systematic and uniform 
approach will be followed. 
Colville leaves an important issue unresolved. The permissi-
ble use of water found to be impliedly reserved under the Win-
ters doctrine due to changing customs and habits of the Indian 
lifestyle remains unclear. The ambiguous and often "unarticu-
lated"92 purposes of a reservation may make it possible to deter-
mine the implied use of reserved water only on a case-by-case 
basis. The Ninth Circuit's expression that the Indians should 
have the power to determine what would best serve the reserva-
tion's interests may be either an equitable solution or a fleeting 
hope for Indian sovereignty. 
Jeffrey A. Titus 
II. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN LAW 
In other cases, the Ninth Circuit refused to categorize Indi-
ans displaced by coal mining operations as "displaced persons" 
and held that descendants of a treaty-signatory tribe must main-
tain an organized tribal structure to assert treaty fishing rights. 
A. NARROW INTERPRETATION OF "DISPLACED PERSONS" 
In Austin v. Andrus,l the Ninth Circuit refused to define 
"displaced persons" to include Indians where the displacement 
did not stem from an acquisition by a federal or stale agency. A 
Bureau of Indian Affairs study determined that coal could be 
mined profitably on reservations and used for coal fired power 
plants. 1I Subsequently, the plaintiffs, the Navajo tribe, author-
ized a Peabody Coal Company subsidiary to explore the Navajo 
92. 657 F.2d at 47. 
1. 638 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Poole, J.; the other panel members were Merrill, 
J. and Brown, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. Id. at 114. 
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Reservation for minerals.3 Following Bureau of Indian Affairs 
approval, Peabody Coal conducted exploratory drilling, then ne-
gotiated leases for mining rights.· 
In 1970, Peabody Coal began mining the land. In 1975, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the mining displaced them from their 
homes and applied for Federal assistance as "displaced persons" 
under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Ac-
quisition Policies Act of 1970 (the Relocation Act).11 The Depart-
ment of the Interior rejected their claim. The plaintiffs sued for 
a declaratory judgement in 1976 and moved for summary judg-
ment in 1977. The government cross-motioned to dismiss or, in 
the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court 
granted summary judgment for the governmente and plaintiffs 
appealed. 
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit 
first examined the Relocation Act's definition of "displaced per-
sons."" Section 101(6) of the Relocation Act limits the phrase 
"displaced persons" to those who relocate because of a federal 
agency~s "acquisition of such property" to undertake programs 
or projects.' Within this definition, the Austin court focussed on 
the meaning of acquisition. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that although the Supreme Court 
construed section 101(6) in Alexander v. BUD,' the Court left 
3. Id. The Coal Company also contracted with the Hopi and the Navajo to explore 
several thousand acres of the Navajo-Hopi Joint Use Area. 
4. Id. The Department of the' Interior approved the leases. 
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976). Plaintiffs argued that under § 101(6), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4601(6), they come within the meaning of "displaced persons." For the text of 
§ 101(6), see note 8 infra. 
·6. 638 F.2d at 115. 
7. Id. at 115-16. 
8. Section 101(6) states in part: 
The term "displaced person" means any person who, on 
or after January 2, 1971, moves from real property, or moves 
his personal property from real property, as a result of the ac-
quisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the 
result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate 
real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Fed-
eral agency, or with Federal financial assistance .... 
42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976). 
9. 441 U.S. 39 (1978). 
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open the definition of acquisition.10 The Alexander Court ac-
knowledged, however, that lower courts, led by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Moorer v. HUn,l1 have construed acquisition to include 
only actions of public entities. 111 The Austin court then adopted 
the Moorer rationale that Congress intended the Relocation Act 
"to benefit those displaced by public agencies with coercive ac-
quisition power, such as eminent domain."18 The Moorer court 
found the critical inquiry was "whether the person involved was 
displaced by governmental action" rather than the degree of 
Federal or state agency involvement.14 
Other circuits have adopted the Moorer test. lII Finding that 
Moorer furnished a rational rule,18 the Austin court employed 
that test to affirm the summary judgment.17 
B. ORGANIZED TRIBAL STRUCTURE REQUIRED TO ASSERT TREATY 
FISHING RIGHTS 
In United States v. Washington,18 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a group of Indians who descended from a treaty-signatory 
tribe could not assert treaty fishing rights because they had 
failed to maintain an organized tribal structure. Following a dis-
trict court decision that the treaty tribes were entitled to fifty 
percent of the harvestable fish on their traditional off-reserva-
tion fishing grounds,l& several groups of Indians, including the 
10. 638 F.2d at 116. The Alexander Court construed the "written order" portion of 
§ 101(6) and did not reach the scope of the acquisition clause. 441 U.S. at 117. See note 8 
supra for the relevant portions of § 101(6). 
11. 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). 
12. 441 U.S. at 48 n.9. 
13. 638 F.2d at 116 (quoting Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175, 182 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978)). 
14. 561 F.2d at 183. 
15. 638 F.2d at 117 (citing Dawson v. HUD, 592 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1979); Conway 
v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
16. 638 F.2d at 117. 
17. The court also addressed plaintiff's second claim that the government owed 
them a fiduciary obligation. The court found that even if this relationship existed, it 
would not qualify the plaintiffs as "displaced persons." Id. 
18. 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were 
Canby, J. and Patel, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. 
Jan. 12, 1982). 
19. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Until this decision the Indi-
ans had removed only a about five percent of the fish harvest. 641 F.2d at 1371. 
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appellants, intervened to assert fishing rights.1o Although the In-
dians in the instant case were descendents of treaty-signatory 
tribes, their ancestors had lived outside the reservation. Like-
wise, the plaintiffs lived among non-Indians and were not feder-
ally recognized. 
The United States and other appellees claimed that the In-
dians were not entitled to fishing rights because they lacked fed-
eral recognition, a geographic base, and formal tribal control 
over members.11 The district court agreed and limited the exer-
cise of treaty fishing rights to those tribes recognized as Indian 
political bodies by the United StateS.11 
In affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit disapproved 
the federal recognition standard used by the district court. aa The 
Washington court also explained the Ninth Circuit view of the 
"single necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of 
treaty rights by a group of Indians descended from a treaty sig-
natory: the group must have maintained an organized tribal 
structure. " .. 
The court found the sole reason for the condition is to iden-
tify the group asserting the treaty rights as the group named in 
the treaty.1II This condition was met where some "characteristic 
of the original tribe persists in an evolving tribal community.'''' 
The Ninth Circuit recognized two difficulties with the treaty-
tribe standard. First, the assimilation of the Indians into non-
Indian communities destroyed some or all of the tribe's distinc-
tiveness.1'7 Second, "a tribal structure that never existed cannot 
be maintained."le Thus, once assimilation of the tribe is com-
pleted, the tribe can no longer claim tribal rights. III This result is 
dictated by the "communal nature of tribal rights."" 
20. United States v. Washington. 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979). 
21. 641 F.2d at 1371. 
22. ld. at 1372. 
23. ld. 
24. ld. at 1372. 
25. ld. at 1373. 
26. ld. 
27. ld. 
28. ld. 
29. ld. 
30. ld. 
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The panel rejected the plaintiff's evidence of tribal organi-
zation and held "political and cultural cohesion" insufficient to 
support the assertion of tribal treaty fishing rightsll because the 
plaintiffs failed to "clearly establish the continuous informal cul-
tural influence" concededly required to achieve treaty-tribe 
status.aa 
The Washington panel further held that the Indians assert-
ing the treaty rights had the burden of proving they were extant 
tribes at the time the treaty was signed. aa 
The dissent argued that the district court's findings were so 
permeated with the federal recognition standard that the entire 
factual inquiry was deficient. Specifically, the district court 
made no finding as to "the nature and degree of tribal organiza-
tion existing at the time [of] the treaties. "84 
Thus, in the Ninth ~ircuit, treaty-tribe status requires a 
very strong showing of cultural and political tribal cohesiveness. 
Furthermore, the burden of such a showing is squarely on the 
group asserting the treaty rights. Overall, the decision dimin-
ishes existing tribal treaty rights. It may well result in a decrease 
in the assimilation of Indians into non-Indian communities due 
to a fear of losing treaty rights. The Washington panel rejected 
the district court's recognition standard but applied a strikingly 
similar approach to deprive assimilated Indian tribes of vested 
treaty rights. 
31. [d. The Indians pointed to the management of interim fisheries, pursuit of indi-
vidual members claims, and social activities as evidence of tribal organization. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. at 1374. 
34. [d. at 1375. 
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